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STRENGTHENING PUBLIC SAFETY NETS: CAN THE 
INFORMAL SECTOR SHOW THE WAY? 
 
Jonathan Morduch and Manohar Sharma   ii 
ABSTRACT 
Helping to reduce vulnerability poses a new set of challenges for public policy. 
The most immediate challenge is to determine the appropriate role for public action—if 
there should be a role at all. A starting point is the ways that communities and extended 
families try to cope with difficulties in the absence of government interventions. Coping 
mechanisms range from the informal exchange of transfers and loans within families and 
communities to more structured institutions that enable an entire community to provide 
protections to their neediest members. The existence of this web of private and nonformal 
mechanisms prompts a series of questions:  
•  Will building public safety nets wind up largely displacing existing 
mechanisms—and thus offering limited net gain to households?   
•  Would it be more effective to try to strengthen existing mechanisms rather than to 
create wholly new institutions?   
•  Can the private sector and nongovernmental organizations play larger roles?  
•  Can we systematically predict when informal insurance and the private sector will 
be most problematic—and when they will be most effective? 
This paper provides some speculative answers based on recent experience. We 
describe important places for public action, as well as its limits. More generally—and 
perhaps more importantly, the paper aims to systematize the main trade-offs that arise 
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Public safety nets are created with many objectives. Most efforts focused 
originally on raising the consumption of the poor through publicly-provided transfers. 
But policymakers are increasingly turning to ways to help low-income households cope 
with income fluctuations as well. Where does public action fit in? The answer depends on 
how (and how well) households currently navigate and use the web of available 
institutions to address risk (Morduch 1999a).  
The importance placed on addressing income fluctuations stems from three main 
concerns. First, a great deal of risk can, in itself, be a great burden to carry. Looming 
uncertainty can weigh down individuals spiritually and emotionally and can shape social 
and economic relationships to the detriment of the poor. Second, the steps available to 
households to address risks can be costly and limited in effectiveness (such as selling 
assets at a discount in times of wide-scale misfortune), creating a demand for more 
efficient, reliable mechanisms. Short-term benefits from existing mechanisms can carry 
high long-term costs, and it is natural to ask whether public action can help support a 
better balance. And, third, severe misfortune can sometimes trigger downward spirals in 
conditions that make recovery even more difficult than it would have been at the outset. 
Because of these concerns, reducing vulnerability has risen to near the top of the agenda 
on safety-net strategies, forming a central building block of both the recent Social 
Protection Strategy Paper (Holtzmann and Jorgensen) and the World Development 
Report 2000/2001 (World Bank 2000).   2 
Helping to reduce vulnerability poses a new set of challenges for public policy. 
The most immediate challenge is to determine the appropriate role—if any—for public 
action. A starting point is the ways that communities and extended families cope with 
difficulties in the absence of government interventions. Coping mechanisms range from 
the informal exchange of transfers and loans within families and communities, to more 
structured institutions like the Zunde ramambo found in parts of rural Zimbabwe. (In the 
Zunde ramambo, the village chief allocates fields to be collectively worked by the 
community, and then distributes the proceeds to the needy.
1) Access to savings and credit 
provide other buffers, while publicly-owned insurance companies often provide 
additional means to reduce vulnerability, particularly through health and crop insurance. 
Looking ahead, some private insurance companies and microfinance institutions are 
starting pilot programs to test possibilities for providing life, health, and property-related 
insurance to low-income clients, and this sector may soon grow dramatically. 
The existence of this web of private and nonformal mechanisms prompts a series 
of questions:  
 
•  Will building public safety nets wind up largely displacing existing 
mechanisms—and thus offering limited net gain to households?  
•  Would it be more effective to try to strengthen existing mechanisms rather than to 
create wholly new institutions?  
                                                 
1 A brief discussion of the zunde ramambo concept can be found in Chinowaita (2000).   3 
•  Can the private sector and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) play larger 
roles?  
•  Can we systematically predict when informal insurance and the private sector will 
be most problematic—and when they will be most effective? 
 
This module provides some speculative answers based on recent experience. We 
describe important places for public action, as well as its limits. More generally—and 
perhaps more importantly—the module aims to systematize the main trade-offs that arise 
when evaluating policy options. 
 
2. SOURCES OF INCOME RISK AND TYPOLOGIES OF 
INFORMAL INSURANCE 
For poor households, downturns in income, even if temporary, can cause severe 
hardship. In the absence of any insurance mechanisms, all income losses would have to 
be absorbed by equivalent expenditures reductions. When normal income levels 
themselves suffice to finance only very basic consumption expenditures, any further cut 
in expenditures can have serious, and in some cases catastrophic, effects on household 
welfare. Illness of family members may be left unattended, children may be pulled out of 
school, or food consumption may be cut to levels that hamper normal activities or retard 
physical or mental growth of children. When income downturns are very severe,   4 
households may be forced to sell productive assets to finance current consumption, 
lowering expected future income levels. 
The potential distress caused by downward fluctuations in income provides 
powerful incentives for poor households to make arrangements for mitigating the effects 
of income variability, especially given that formal financial institutions that offer 
insurance services tend to be poorly developed. In general, the nature of informal 
arrangements made to cope with income variability respond to the following four distinct 
considerations. 
 
EX ANTE MANAGEMENT OF RISKS VERSUS EX POST RISK COPING 
When confronted with a risky income profile, risk-averse households have strong 
incentives to take steps to contain potential distress to some levels. Two distinct—though 
related—strategies are available. First, households can be expected to make 
prearrangements to mitigate distress once events resulting in income losses have already 
occurred, such as in the aftermath of a bad harvest or reduced labor earning due to illness. 
These kinds of arrangements are generally known as ex post risk coping arrangements. 
Even in the absence of formal institutions of insurance, various informal mechanisms 
such as risk pooling arrangements among kin, friends, and neighbors, use of accumulated 
precautionary savings, and credit lines maintained with different types of lenders are used 
to finance expenditures to uphold average consumption levels during income downturns. 
These mechanisms, therefore, are also referred to as consumption-smoothing strategies.   5 
A second strategy would be for risk-averse households to choose from among 
employment or production possibilities those activities that contain income variability to 
some acceptable levels, effectively choosing to smooth income in order to smooth 
consumption. They can do so, for example, by making conservative production choices in 
agriculture, adopting less risky crop varieties, or engaging in wage labor rather than 
riskier entrepreneurial activities. But these choices are not without cost, since they may 
mean forgoing higher levels of average profits in order to secure steady income. For 
example, a study suggests that farmers could substantially raise average profits by 
increasing the application of fertilizer; however, by using less fertilizer, investment losses 
are reduced during bad times. 
Because of the potential losses involved, decisions of households to engage in 
safer but relatively less profitable earning activities depend importantly on available ex 
post coping strategies. This introduces a difficulty in disentangling actions related to ex 
ante management of risks from actions related to ex post risk coping. If lack of 
consumption-smoothing mechanisms forces households to smooth income, there will 
appear to be less riskiness than is actually present, and common indicators of risks will 
understate inherent variability. 
 
COVARIANT RISK VERSUS IDIOSYNCRATIC RISKS 
Ex post coping mechanisms that rely on risk sharing carry the greatest potential 
benefit when income risks faced by risk-sharing partners (individual or households) are 
unrelated to one another. When income risk is idiosyncratic to the household, a downturn   6 
in income faced by one household is less likely to coincide with a downturn in incomes 
of other households that are partners in the risk-sharing arrangement. This makes it 
possible—or easier—for participating households to support consumption-smoothing 
efforts of the affected households through compensatory transfers or lending. On the 
contrary, when income risks are similar, resulting in the co-movement in incomes across 
households, all households place demands for compensatory finance simultaneously, and 
risk sharing is not possible. Within weather-dependent agriculture areas in developing 
countries, it is likely that communities of households engaging in similar agricultural 
practices on near-adjacent fields face covariant weather-induced risks. In such cases, 
consumption smoothing via ex post risk sharing is likely to be ineffective, especially in 
the aftermath of extensive rain failure. When the negative shock is large and widespread, 
it is also likely that the resulting village-wide decline in income, demand, wages, and 
prices may reduce the effectiveness of actions to uphold consumption through the sale of 
precautionary assets or by increasing participation in labor markets.  
However, except in cases of widespread weather-related crises or the occurrence 
of similar large-scale calamities (war, earthquakes, etc.), the greatest risks are often 
idiosyncratic to particular households. For example, Morduch (1991) shows that even in 
highly risk-prone semi-arid tropics in south India, as much as 75 to 96 percent of the 
variance in the logarithm of household income is attributable to idiosyncratic shocks 
(some is attributable, however, to measurement error). Household-specific idiosyncratic 
risks typically arise not only out of field- or plot-specific weather and pest risks, but also 
out of incidences of human and animal illness; unemployment spells faced by household   7 
members; births, deaths, migration, and division of extended families; and failure of 
household-specific businesses. The generally wide prevalence of idiosyncratic risks 
suggests that there is considerable scope for risk-averse households to enter into mutually 
advantageous insurance contracts.  
 
UNANTICIPATED RISK VERSUS ANTICIPATED INCOME VARIABILITY  
When the nature of income variability can be anticipated with a high degree of 
certainty, the household is in a better position to plan for it. Take the well-known 
agricultural production cycle. Knowing that production takes place (and attendant costs 
are incurred) with the seasons, while consumption demands are constant, simplifies the 
business of tailoring employment plans and saving and credit decisions to match 
consumption demand. Seasonal migration for employment coinciding with the lean 
agricultural season, for example, can be planned and timed with considerable foresight 
and a high level of certainty. Labor contracts, likewise, can be entered into that explicitly 
take into account the agricultural season. Agricultural inputs may be purchased on credit 
from merchants with clear arrangements to repay after harvest. In each of these examples, 
advance knowledge of future events and their effects means that low-risk transactions can 
be easily made.  
Another example of variability that can be quite reasonably anticipated is that of 
income earning through the life cycle. Generally, most people can expect that earnings 
from employment will decrease sharply at retirement. It is also known that susceptibility 
to illness or the probability of experiencing various types of physical disabilities increases   8 
considerably at old age and that death eventually occurs. Because of the high level of 
certainty with which these events will occur, there is a basis for making clear plans 
related to saving for retirement (see Section 5). In many developing countries, 
consideration of these factors has given rise to institutional extended and 
intergenerationally-linked families whose daughters and sons are expected to assist and 
care for old-age parents. It also explains why funeral societies are so widespread in many 
parts of the world (see Section 6).  
On the other hand, many contingencies can only be forecast poorly. That farmers 
are often willing to postpone decisions on the intensity of fertilizer application until 
rainfall patterns become clearer is indicative of the value of gaining more accurate 
information. In agriculture, the profit-maximizing level of fertilizer depends on the 
availability of other inputs such as water. Under semi-arid conditions, water availability 
depends on rainfall, an uncertain, and therefore stochastic, outcome. If fertilizer is applied 
to optimum water availability, profits are maximized if rainfall is good, but losses will be 
large if rainfall turns out to be poor. On the other hand, if application of fertilizer is 
reduced to sub-optimal levels of water availability, profit will be lower if rainfall is good 
but losses will be lower if rainfall is poor. Because of this uncertainty, the farmer is 
literally forced to “gamble,” and his decision will depend on his risk-taking 
ability/preference and his assessment of the likely rainfall pattern. Given that waiting for 
the onset of rains increases the accuracy of the farmer’s assessment of weather 
conditions, he will frequently choose to do so. 
   9 
RISK SHARING: SPATIAL VERSUS TEMPORAL SMOOTHING 
Risks may be shared across individuals or households at a given point of time, as 
when a household experiencing a negative income shock receives a transfer from his risk-
pooling partner who has not shared the same fate. Or risk may be pooled across time, as 
when a household borrows money during a “bad” time and repays it in the future when 
times are “good.” In the first case, risk is shared among individuals across space; in the 
later case, individuals share risks over time. There is, however, an inherent time-
dimension in the case of interhousehold transfers, as the principle of reciprocity forms the 
core of such transfers: current recipients of the transfers are expected to reciprocate in the 
future by providing transfers to other risk-pooling partners experiencing negative income 
shocks. We discuss this further in Section 3. 
 
3. INTERHOUSEHOLD TRANSFERS 
One of the first ways that households cope with misfortune is through access to 
the resources of extended families and communities. Communities and families value 
their roles as support networks, and that support often comes in the form of transfers, 
either in-kind or in cash. Sometimes there is an explicit understanding that the transfers 
will have to be reciprocated when the donor is next in need; at other times the sense of 
reciprocity is looser (perhaps to be reciprocated by helping a member of a younger 
generation, perhaps by performing other kinds of services); and at still other times,   10 
transfers take the form of loans, to be paid back once the household is back on its feet 
(but often without an interest charge). 
How important are transfers? The answer varies a great deal by location. While 
65 percent of poor households in Jamaica report receiving transfers, less than a third do in 
Bulgaria and Russia. For those that receive transfers in Russia, however, the average 
amount is large: private transfers make up, on average, nearly 70 percent of the income of 
the poorest quintile of the population (Cox, Galasso, and Jimenez 2000 cited in World 
Bank 2000). 
To what extent does nonformal insurance (of which private transfers are one kind) 
protect consumption levels in the face of income shortfalls? In the Philippines, a recent 
study shows that young households faced with the acute illness of a member were 
reasonably able to protect overall consumption levels. And in Indonesia, households 
(averaging across both young and old) were able to protect consumption levels against 70 
percent of the income loss associated with moderate illness. The consumption levels of 
older households in the Philippines, however, were found to be very vulnerable in the 
face of acute illness. And in Indonesia, consumption levels of households were, on 
average, reduced by about 70 percent of shortfalls associated with long-term acute illness.  
Clearly, the distribution of transfers is very unevenly distributed across poor 
households. Even in the same country, there are large regional differences, as some poor 
households have broad access while others receive little or none. This evidence points to 
several tendencies: 
   11 
•  Despite the much-discussed role of intergenerational transfers, elderly 
populations tend to be much more vulnerable than younger populations, in part 
due to the weakening of nonformal intergenerational “social security” systems in 
the face of increased migration and the splintering of households. 
•  Large, catastrophic losses are more difficult to handle through private means, 
relative to smaller, more common losses. 
•  Idiosyncratic events (like non-epidemic illness) that tend to affect individuals one 
at a time are easier to address through nonformal insurance, compared with 
events that affect entire communities (like poor harvests) or broad regions (like 
inflation or earthquakes). After the drought in the Sahel in the early 1980s, for 
example, private transfers made up just 3 percent of average losses faced by poor 
households.  
•  Poor households tend to be much more vulnerable than households with more 
assets. A recent longitudinal study from China, for example, shows that for the 
bottom 10 percent of households, 40 percent of a bad shock translated into 
consumption declines. But for the richest 10 percent, only 10 percent of the shock 
translated into a consumption decline. 
•  Socially excluded groups among the poor fare worst under systems of nonformal 
insurance, while households with extensive community networks may be able to 
cope with moderate idiosyncratic shocks quite well. 
   12 
Nonformal insurance systems do not work well for many of the same reasons that 
private, commercial insurance tends to fail—and other reasons as well.  
Contract enforcement. The first problem is that it’s often difficult to enforce 
“contracts,” so the most feasible arrangements are those that make participants want to 
stay in. A participant who has pledged—but is not legally bound—to help a neighbor  
may have mixed feelings about making good on his obligations, especially if he himself 
is struggling to get by. But he is more likely to fulfill obligations if he sees that breaking 
the pledge today will deny him the opportunity to receive the benefit at some future time. 
The question then is whether the short-term gain from breaking the pledge (and thus 
keeping the money that would have been used to help the neighbor) is smaller than the 
long-term benefits of expected future help. If so, the nonformal insurance program will 
be sustainable, even without legal enforcement sanctions. In practice, this means that 
nonformal insurance will tend to limit the size of benefits in order to ensure that the 
short-term gains from breaking the pledge to help others are smaller than the expected 
long-term benefits of cooperation.  
Moral hazard. The second tension involves moral hazard.
2 The problem arises 
only when information about the recipient’s behavior is costly to obtain—which may not 
be a problem in a village setting. But where obtaining information is a problem, the 
possibility arises that participants in insurance arrangements will not take adequate 
                                                 
2 Once an insurance contract is entered into, there is generally less incentive to take actions to avoid risks 
pertaining to the insured event. Some of these actions cannot be observed or are excessively costly to 
observe, so the insurance contract cannot stipulate actions to be taken by the insured. This is called “moral 
hazard.”    13 
precautions against risks, saddling family and neighbors with greater expected 
obligations to help out in times of loss than had been bargained for. 
Diversity of resources and trajectories. A third source of tension is that household 
incomes do not grow at uniform rates within communities. Some households stay in place 
or slip backward; others move ahead. Those that get ahead are generally in a better 
position to insure the rest of the community, but they will tend to make sure that they are 
getting value for their help. As an “insurance” scheme slips into becoming a process for 
systematic redistribution from richer to poorer, the scheme may become increasingly less 
appealing to richer households. It is common to see those richer households then pulling 
away from intensive community-based insurance obligations and either insuring on their 
own or forming new insurance groups just with richer households—to the detriment of 
the poorer households. Diverse patterns of resources and trajectories of income growth 
thus make it hard to achieve broad, community-based informal insurance arrangements. 
The problem poses a conundrum. On the one hand, more diversity of occupations and of 
probabilities of gains and losses is better for the health of insurance arrangements since it 
creates greater scope for diversification. But unfortunately, on the other hand, the 
diversity tends to undermine the cohesion necessary to make informal arrangements 
survive over time.  
   14 
MOTIVATIONS FOR REMITTANCES 
For those households that do receive transfers, it cannot be simply assumed that 
“insurance” is being provided. Providing help to neighbors and relatives in need is only 
one of many motivations, which we discuss below. 
Remittances form an important source of transfers, especially intra-family 
transfers. For example, roughly two-thirds of all transfer inflows originated abroad in a 
large survey from Pakistan (1985–88) (Foster and Rosenzweig 1999). And in the 
Philippines, 26 percent of urban households (and 13 percent of rural households) received 
remittances from abroad (Cox and Jimenez 1995). These flows pertain both to spouses 
remitting to their families and to migrant children in urban areas remitting to their parents 
in the countryside (see, e.g., Paulson 1995, on Thailand, and Lucas and Stark 1985, on 
Botswana). 
Family members migrate and remit for a number of reasons. In many cases, the 
decision is made primarily to increase total household income and little to do with 
seeking insurance cover. With limited local income earning opportunities, members may 
decide to migrate to other locations where returns to labor or to other skills possessed by 
them are higher. Their subsequent decision to remit may simply reflect altruistic motives 
seeking to maximize family rather than individual welfare. In many remote communities 
with seasonal agriculture, it is widespread practice that individual members temporarily 
migrate to areas with better seasonal employment and subsequently return home and pool 
all earned incomes.   15 
However, families also recognize that, frequently, income earnings across 
geographical locations are only weakly correlated. For this reason, they may strategically 
use migration as a way to diversify and reduce variability in family income. For instance, 
placing some family members in town and pooling village and town income offer 
insurance to both urban migrants and for those who stay in the village. As Lucas (1997) 
notes, risk-averse families may gain from such a strategy, even if mean incomes and 
variance are the same across locations—as long as incomes do not co-vary. Since the 
remittance arrangement between the migrant and the family is voluntary, it must be self-
enforcing. Altruism, as explained above, is one of the most obvious forces propelling 
such enforcement. However, remittances are propelled by motives of self-interest, too. 
First, it may be that remittances are important means by which to lay claims to 
inheritance on family assets. Second, migrants typically are those family members who 
have benefited the most from investments in education, and remittances may simply be a 
means of reimbursing investment expenses to the household. Third, and quite related, 
insofar as it is the younger family members that migrate, remittance may actually 
constitute paying back to the older generations for services rendered in the past.  
Whatever the motivation behind the decision to remit, family members placed in 
weakly correlated earning activities are in a better position to pool risks than others. What 
is less clear is the extent to which families strategically diversify income through 
migration. Lucas and Stark (1985) find that in Botswana, the receipt of remittances 
depends on an interaction between the severity of droughts and the ownership of drought-
sensitive assets such a cattle. In rural India, Rosenzweig and Stark (1989) show evidence   16 
that households establish marital ties with those living in distant locations that are less 
likely to have covariant incomes. De la Brière et al. (1997) studied factors that motivate 
Dominican migrants to send remittances to their rural parents. They found that 
investment toward inheritance is the main motivation to remit for men, younger migrants, 
and migrants intending to return. In contrast, insurance is the main motivation to remit for 
women migrants, particularly among those with no intention to return to their birthplace. 
 
4. SELF-INSURANCE: DIVERSIFYING ASSET PORTFOLIOS AND 
REALLOCATING LABOR 
As indicated in Section 2, households lacking the means to uphold consumption 
during income downturns often take steps to employ production techniques or engage in 
occupations that have smaller income variability, even if it means ending up with a lower 
average income. Examples from real life abound. Poorer farmers avoid newer crop 
varieties that yield higher revenues but involve a learning period where misjudgments at 
critical stages of crop management can result in precipitous declines in yield. A wage 
earner, not wanting to expose her children to shortfall in essential consumption, may 
deliberately shun the higher-paying daily wage labor market for a lower-paying but 
longer-term labor contract with a local landlord. An urban resident may opt for a secured 
but low paying government job rather than confront the insecurity of private-sector 
employment.    17 
Two factors have a bearing on such decisions. First, poor households are risk 
averse and are willing to forgo a certain amount of earnings to protect consumption. 
Second, risk avoidance will be a more serious concern for those lacking ex post coping 
mechanisms. Or to put it differently, a highly risk-averse individual with very good 
consumption insurance may in his production decision act “as if” he were risk neutral 
(Morduch 1995).  
If access to insurance increases with income, it follows that richer households will 
appear to act riskier than poor households. In semi-arid conditions of India, Binswanger 
and Rosenzweig (1993) observe how, as environment gets riskier, vulnerable households 
shift production into more conservative, but less profitable, modes. They find, for 
example, that increasing the coefficient of variation of rainfall timing by one percent 
would result in income smoothing action of bottom wealth quartile that reduces their 
profits 35 percent. In contrast, a household at the median income level would reduce 
income only by 15 percent, while it would have negligible impact on profitability of the 
richest farmers. An implication of this finding is that differential access to consumption 
insurance between the poor and nonpoor may exacerbate income inequality. 
A study by Bliss and Stern (1982), again in India, found that farmers were not 
using profit-maximizing levels of fertilizer, attributing this to attempts to cut investment 
losses in case of poor harvest. Morduch (1990) finds that in south India, households 
whose consumption levels were most vulnerable to income shocks devote a greater share 
of land to safer, traditional varieties of rice and castor than to riskier high-yielding 
varieties. He also finds that the most vulnerable households are more likely to diversify   18 
plots, a common means of reducing the impact of weather shocks. Further, Rosenzweig 
and Start (1989), using the same dataset, find that households facing greater volatility in 
farm profits are also more likely to have a household member employed in steady wage 
employment. Bardhan (1984) explains why tied labor contracts at low wages may be 
mutually beneficially to the poor laborer and his employer: while the employer secures 
uninterrupted labor supply, the laborer secures a steady flow of income to finance 
consumption. 
A certain degree of poverty entrapment may therefore be inevitable when poor 
and risk-averse households deliberately shun new or profitable activities in order to 
contain income risks to some minimum level. This issue is discussed in further detail in 
Section 9. 
 
5. INDIGENOUS INSURANCE MECHANISMS AND COMMUNITY 
INSTITUTIONS 
The Zunde Ramambo described in the introduction is one example of how 
communities come together to protect their neediest members. Another institution 
common in many communities is the burial society. We provide an example from fishing 
communities in Cochin, India.
3 Organizers of the society, who are often associated with a 
church, temple, mosque, or social club, solicit membership from at least 300 people. With 
                                                 
3 The example is from Rutherford (2000).   19 
this size, the fund can be reasonably well diversified and will not fall apart if a cluster of 
claims comes unexpectedly soon after the fund is started.  
We consider a fund that operates for just one year. During the year, each member 
contributes at least 2 rupees per week (about 4 cents). For each rupee per week 
contributed, the society guarantees that if a member of the contributor’s family dies 
within the year (with exclusions for infants and partial exclusions for young children), the 
family gets 500 rupees from the fund. Members can increase coverage by increasing 
weekly contributions, and the fund typically is left with a positive balance at the end of 
the year—which is then distributed back to the members, while deficits are made up 
through extra collections. The burial society thus provides insurance against the high 
costs of funerals and the loss of future earnings. With a low minimum contribution, most 
poor households are able to participate.  
Another form of burial society is not restricted to lasting for just a year. Instead, 
regular payments are made and the family receives a payout at the time of death, tied to 
the contributions made up until that point. The death benefit might, for example, be a 
doubling of the contributions made to date. How does the fund break even? The fund 
would lose if the money were only disbursed when members die. The money, however, is 
instead lent out to members of the community at competitive interest rates (in Cochin at 4 
percent per month), guaranteeing that the fund grows steadily and dividends can be paid. 
As long as there are enough long-lived participants, the fund will be financially healthy. 
The cost for participants is another matter. While the funds are popular, they are 
much more expensive than comparable policies sold by state insurers in India. Those   20 
insurers lack the neighborhood ties at the heart of the burial societies, but they have much 
greater ability to diversify risk. This realization has prompted NGOs and microfinance 
organizations to move toward providing cheaper, community-based insurance products 
with greater scope for risk diversification. 
 
6. HOUSEHOLD SAVINGS 
Typically, the most important coping mechanism that households have is to 
accumulate assets in times of relative surplus and then draw them down in times of need. 
This might involve building up a savings account, hiding cash, or purchasing durable 
goods that can be sold later.  
Poor households tend not to have formal savings accounts in many parts of the 
world, however (although some microfinance programs are beginning to develop 
successful savings products). Instead, most of the assets on which households rely carry 
risks of their own—like owning a draft animal or other livestock that are vulnerable to 
illness or adverse price shocks. In fact, as Dercon (1999) argues, the returns to the assets 
used by households for “saving” are often positively correlated with incomes. So when 
income falls, the assets also lose some of their value. And, when income is relatively 
high, the assets are also worth more. When incomes have a strong common component in 
a region, this can make it hard to build up assets in the first place—as they will be most 
expensive when households want to buy them, and least valuable when sold. Still, selling   21 
assets and drawing down savings is a common first line of defense when misfortune 
strikes. 
In the absence of savings accounts and good possibilities for buying and selling 
assets, rotating saving and credit associations (ROSCAs) can play a key role in saving. 
ROSCAs are seen worldwide under many different names. Within Africa, ROSCAs are 
known as susu in Ghana, esusu in Nigeria, upatu or mchezo in Tanzania, chilemba or 
chiperegani in Malawi, and tontines throughout francophone Africa (Steel et al. 1997), 
and tend to function in the same basic way. First, they have a fixed life span. Within that 
span, members contribute funds weekly or at other regular intervals. With each round of 
contributions to the common pot, one member of the group is given the whole amount. 
The pot is typically used to buy goods that are too costly (and not divisible) to purchase 
with the typical weekly cash flow of households.  
In one version, the pot is allocated to members (by predetermined order) until 
everyone gets a turn, but the insurance aspects may be limited here, since households 
cannot guarantee that they will get the pot exactly when they most need it. “Bidding 
ROSCAs” aim to address this problem. Here, members are allowed to bid on the 
opportunity to get the pot—for example, to address a short-term income shortfall. While 
it might thus be costly, it will typically be much cheaper than having to turn to 
moneylenders. Savers (those who do not need the pot) benefit, too, by acting implicitly as 
moneylenders. 
A big advantage of ROSCAs is that they are simple. Since funds circulate at all 
times, there is no need for deposit facilities. Accounting requirements are thus minimal,   22 
and the arrangements have a clear beginning and end—after which they tend to start up 
again for another cycle.  
A disadvantage is that they are inflexible and, for savers, they tie up money that 
could be needed to address a temporary crisis. This same aspect can, of course, also be an 
advantage for those who lack the discipline to save.  
An interesting new program in Bangladesh has attempted to build on the strengths 
of ROSCAs while incorporating greater flexibility. SafeSave was started by a 
microfinance expert (who brought experience replicating the Grameen Bank) and by a 
former manager of ROSCAs. Unlike most microfinance programs, SafeSave focuses on 
helping its 5,000 clients build up savings; this is facilitated by staff, who visit clients in 
their homes or places of business daily. Each day, clients decide how much to save—
perhaps just a few cents or the equivalent of a dollar or two—and, over time, they can 
build up bank accounts with a “usefully large” lump of money. If clients need to borrow 
(for whatever purpose—loans are not restricted to business needs), the program allows 
borrowing against savings. The existence of ROSCAs and the success of SafeSave 
challenges the notion that most poor households are simply too poor to save. Instead, the 
SafeSave experience suggests that when safe, convenient ways to make savings deposits 
are established, the poor can and do save. The program appears to be valued highly by 
clients, a lesson also suggested by the experience of susu collectors in West Africa, who 
also go from household to household taking small deposits on a regular basis—and 
charge a substantial fee for doing so.    23 
Can programs like SafeSave be replicated? There are at least two constraints. 
First, SafeSave is able to cut costs dramatically by working in the densely populated 
slums of Dhaka. The costs of visiting clients daily are thus much lower than if clients 
lived in scattered villages. It might, however, be possible to visit clients somewhat less 
regularly—as do the susu collectors—and still provide many of the benefits of daily 
collection. It may also be possible to set up temporary “bank posts,” in weekly or 
biweekly markets, in order to provide deposit facilities where and when clients need them 
most. This variation was implemented successfully by the Bank Kredit Kecamatan in 
Indonesia. 
The second constraint is regulatory: programs that take deposits should be 
regulated for the protection of clients. SafeSave is set up as a cooperative; thus, the full 
weight of Bangladesh’s banking laws do not apply, but were SafeSave to expand and 
provide additional financial services, it would face a new set of accounting and 
management hurdles. One of the reasons that most microfinance programs have focused 
on lending so far is that the legal environment for providing flexible deposit-taking 
services is often forbidding. 
Thus, one step in helping households to better prepare themselves for risk is to revisit 
banking regulations with an eye to whether regulations written for large, commercial 
banks can be adapted to better accommodate microfinance organizations serving the 
poor.  
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7. MICROFINANCE AND MICROINSURANCE 
Among the financial institutions serving poor households, microfinance programs 
have emerged as important players in many parts of the world (Morduch 1999b). The 
most famous programs are the Grameen Bank of Bangladesh, BancoSol of Bolivia, and 
the Bank Rakyat Indonesia, all of which have very different models and clients. All of the 
programs, though, are typically set up to make small loans (sometimes as small as $50 or 
$100, and sometimes as large as several thousand dollars) to households lacking access to 
formal-sector banks. The loans are typically earmarked for the expansion or development 
of small businesses. Can these programs help households reduce their vulnerability? 
What role can they play in safety nets? 
The most obvious role that the programs can play is by helping households to 
increase their incomes and in turn increase savings. Second, while most programs focus 
on loans for business development, those funds are typically sufficiently fungible that 
they can often help provide extra cash to help households cope with consumption shocks 
as well. Third, the loans can help households start new businesses that provide income 
diversification, so “all eggs are not in the same basket”; diversification may help smooth 
consumption over seasons and from year to year. 
On the other hand, by tying households to rigid payment schedules, microfinance 
can add to vulnerability. In the face of a crisis, paying off debt is that much harder, so the 
credit-orientation of the programs may often make households less secure, not more so.    25 
Recognizing this, many microfinance programs are now turning to the possibility 
of providing “microinsurance” to their clients as well. Most of the new microinsurance 
programs are just in pilot stages, but those that provide life insurance already look 
promising institutionally. Those that provide health insurance have further to go.  
One policy that has been very successful is “credit-life insurance.” For a small 
fee, this insurance pays off the client’s remaining debt should the client die with an 
outstanding balance, sparing neighbors and relatives from having to assume the burden. 
This is clearly a benefit for the lender as well as the borrower. For example, the 
microfinance organization FINCA in Kampala, Uganda, charges clients an extra 1 
percent interest per month on loans (raising interest rates from 3 to 4 percent per month) 
to pay for this (mandatory) coverage—in addition to providing supplemental benefits in 
case of death due to “accidents” (for example, if a member dies through an accident, their 
family receives 1.2 million Ugandan shillings—roughly $630). Since the risk of death 
(and accidental death in particular) is low, the plan turns out to be quite profitable for 
FINCA and its partner, the American Insurance Group, while at the same time reducing a 
source of risk perceived to be large by clients. 
In order to better ensure profitability (and address adverse selection
4), most 
microinsurance programs eliminate or limit coverage for older clients (those over age 55, 
65, or 70, depending on the plan). This keeps costs in check, but it undermines the ability 
to most fully strengthen the safety net.  
                                                 
4 The insured know their risk profiles better than the insurance agent, and those with riskier profiles are 
more likely to buy insurance. This is known as “adverse selection.”    26 
Even with such exclusions, however, programs that offer health insurance have 
not, so far, been able to cover their costs. Programs like the Self-Employed Women’s 
Association (SEWA) of Ahmedabad, India, have shown the possibility of providing low-
cost healthcare insurance to poor clients, but their costs are high. Here, moral hazard and 
adverse selection play larger roles. While market surveys suggest that health insurance is 
a higher priority than life insurance, a fully successful model has yet to emerge. The 
microinsurance movement is very young, though, and experiments around the world may 
yield new ideas. At the same time, it must be remembered that while most microfinance 
institutions serve poor clients, few work with the “poorest”—the elderly, the socially 
isolated, and the physically disabled. Microinsurance is thus not likely to be a good 
substitute for broader public measures, but it can provide important help for some 
vulnerable households to cope with the risks of daily life. 
Regulatory issues also come to the foreground when developing even fairly 
simple saving and insurance products. Informal institutions such as those facilitating 
interhousehold transfers thrive on unwritten but well understood principles of conduct 
and contract enforcement. In fact, the success of many microfinance institutions has 
hinged on their ability to piggyback on such arrangements. But as microfinance 
institutions consider more complex insurance contracts, proportionately more complex 
systems of regulation and supervision will be required. Substantial work remains to be 
done in this area. While the absence of appropriate regulation is likely to undermine 
future development, care must also be taken to ensure that excessive regulation does not 
choke off innovation and experimentation.   27 
8. NEW DIRECTIONS: INSURING AGAINST WEATHER SHOCKS 
Most poor households are rural, and the incomes of most rural residents are tied 
closely to the state of agriculture. Weak harvests can create widespread setbacks if prices 
do not rise to compensate. Surpluses, on the other hand, allow households to better 
prepare for the future. State insurance companies around the world have tried to provide 
crop insurance to poor farmers, and, as Yaron, McDonald, and Piprek (1997) describe, 
are seldom successful. The largest problems have been high costs due to the inability to 
control moral hazard and adverse selection, coupled with the administrative burdens of 
verifying and processing claims. Because farmers have limited resources, willingness to 
pay is limited.  
Given these problems, it is natural to ask whether there is a simpler approach. 
Weather insurance is one such idea, and it is currently being tested in Africa and Latin 
America with support from the World Bank and the International Food Policy Research 
Institute. The idea is to insure with regard to the source of losses (in this case, low 
rainfall) rather than the losses themselves (i.e., the poor harvests). A farmer who buys 
rainfall insurance, for example, pays an annual premium and gets a payout whenever 
rainfall as measured by a local weather station is low. If the farmer insures against 
rainfall being so low that such a state only typically occurs once every decade, every $1 
of insurance purchased by the farmer annually would deliver a $10 pay-out in the case of 
extreme dryness (assuming for illustration that the insurer just breaks even and has 
negligible operating costs).   28 
The beauty of the arrangement is that the extent of the payout is independent of 
the farmer’s actual harvest. In principle, the farmer could have a good crop, but could still 
get a payout if measured rainfall is low enough. Or the farmer could have a bad crop but 
not get a payout if rainfall at the local station is adequate. So the value of the insurance 
depends on how highly correlated a farmer’s income is with measured rainfall. If it is 
highly correlated, buying rainfall insurance can be a good bet. 
Since the purchasers of insurance have no control over measured rainfall, the 
direct effects of moral hazard are eliminated as a concern for the insurer. And since the 
characteristics of the purchasers make no difference to the insurer (unlike health 
insurance, where the probability of illness among insurees is important), adverse 
selection ceases to be an issue as well. This last point also means that demand for the 
insurance may well come from many people apart from farmers; for example, traders that 
rely on farm production may also be interested, as may shopkeepers who depend on 
demand from farmers. 
From the insurer’s perspective, the biggest constraint is to find a way to ease the 
burden of taking on such large amounts of risk. A year of very bad weather throughout 
Nicaragua, for example, could wipe out an insurer. Thus, a global market for reinsuring 
weather risks is required; with such a market, insurers in Nicaragua could form contracts 
with intermediaries to share the burden of losses—as could insurers against poor weather 
in Morocco, in China, and other countries. Forming an active reinsurance market for 
weather risks will thus be an important determinant of whether weather insurance can be 
a widespread—and commercially viable—reality.   29 
9. COSTS OF NOT HAVING ADEQUATE INSURANCE STRATEGIES 
While rainfall insurance does not as yet exist, the other mechanisms described 
above do. What are the costs of not having access to these mechanisms? 
First, without adequate insurance coverage, households are likely to take 
significant steps to shield themselves from risks. As indicated in Section 5, this 
frequently means opting for activities with lower means but lower variances. Economic 
change more often than not involves using new technologies, entering into new types of 
businesses and partnerships, or exploring or creating new markets. Many of these actions 
will be inherently risky and will usually involve learning periods that may be even more 
risky. If poor households lacking insurance coverage are those that shy away from these, 
entrapment in low paying activities that reinforce poverty may result. Further, even the 
“safest” income strategies are not completely immune to shocks, especially in rain-
dependent agriculture. When eventually hit by negative income shocks, these households, 
who have only the thinnest asset base and lack access to external ex post coping 
mechanisms, are most vulnerable to both harsh welfare losses and slipping into a poverty 
spiral.  
The second set of consequences has to do with ex post actions. Lacking insurance 
mechanisms, the negative income shock has to be absorbed through reductions in 
household expenditures. The nature of hardship, including its effect on individual family 
members, determines how these reductions are made. When downturns are small, the 
reductions may be in terms of quality downgrades. Quality downgrades that preserve   30 
essential inputs related to basic nutrition and health are feasible options, even for poor 
families. A household may, for example, switch from a relatively expensive cereal, such 
as rice, to cheaper maize or tuber crops that provide a similar nutrient level. However, 
when shocks are larger, not only are the immediate welfare losses associated with 
reduced consumption larger, but there is an increasing possibility that households may 
undertake more drastic action to uphold irreducible consumption at the expense of future 
income and consumption. Examples of such actions are 
 
1.  Pulling school-age children out of school either to save on schooling costs or, 
more commonly, to place them in the labor market to earn additional income; 
2.  Reducing or even canceling planned investments in maintenance of business 
assets that may result in reduced income in future periods. Farmers, for example, 
may defer land-related investments required to maintain soil fertility or small 
entrepreneurs may postpone essential machine repairs or maintenance;  
3.  Depleting free-access community resources such as forest products in order to 
finance current consumption;  
4.  Reducing consumption of nutritious foods that are likely to have more serious 
longer-term consequences on health status of children; 
5.  Choosing not to honor social obligations such as payment of taxes or other 
contributions to community-level activities leading to erosion of social cohesion 
and social instability;   31 
6.  Engaging in distress sales of productive assets such as land or other household 
assets that permanently damage future earning potential; 
7.  Participating in patron-client relationships with grossly disadvantageous terms of 
trade, e.g., bonded laboring; and 
8.  Resorting to distress-induced migration, often to urban centers where there are not 
only additional risks in employment but also even more limited informal 
insurance than previously.  
 
In each of the cases above, current consumption is maintained through actions 
that seriously, sometimes irreversibly, compromise future livelihood, actions that could 
have been avoided if households were able to use financial services to anchor 
consumption to average income.  
 
10. WILL PUBLIC ACTION JUST CROWD OUT PRIVATE ACTIVITY? 
We have described some of the many mechanisms available to households in 
times of need. We turn now to public action. As with all safety net policies, the costs of 
public action need to be weighed against expected benefits—and the net benefits of 
public action may be limited if it mainly serves to crowd out private efforts.  
The uneven distribution of access to informal insurance mechanisms makes 
consideration of crowding out difficult. Providing public safety nets may lead to the 
substantial displacement of private transfers for those who receive private transfers, so   32 
that the net benefits they get are less than the full size of the public transfer. But, even in 
the same region, many households receive little or no private transfers—and thus their net 
benefits can be large. In a study of the extension of South Africa’s pension system in 
1993, for example, Jensen finds that introducing public transfers to the elderly population 
led to a reduction in private transfers to the old by 20 to 40 rand for each 100 rand of 
public transfers. But this holds only for the half of the elderly population that received 
private transfers beforehand. The other half did not report receiving transfers, so the issue 
of crowding out was moot. 
The example raises a series of questions: 
 
•  What are the costs (direct and indirect, explicit and implicit) associated with the 
private efforts? Can private insurance schemes themselves create inefficient 
rigidities or poverty traps as described in Section 7 above? 
•  Who gains from the crowding out? That is, who is it that reduces the transfers 
they had given now that governments are providing resources? Are these 
households poor, too? In the South African case, the donors were mainly young 
households, and the money that was kept went in part to increasing the human 
capital of the youngest generation. This has obvious social benefits, and clearly 
“crowding out” should not imply the simple wasting of resources. It may even 
mean that resources are used more effectively than before.   33 
•  How is the incidence of crowding out distributed by age, region, ethnicity, and 
household structure? 
•  Are public efforts more efficient (and thus less costly overall) than private efforts? 
Even with full crowding out, if the government can provide the same services 
more cheaply than alternatives, there is an argument for continued public 
provision. 
 
Again, not all crowding out is undesirable. Judgments must be made about the social 
objectives that guide the policy.  
 
11. SUMMARY AND ASSESSMENT 
Development practitioners and policymakers have increasingly turned to 
vulnerability as both a symptom of poverty and as a source of poverty. Households have 
many informal mechanisms to address risks, but many carry large (but not always 
immediate or easy to see) costs. 
Policy needs to take potential crowding out into consideration, but it cannot be 
assumed that crowding out will seriously undermine the policy—and crowding out can be 
desirable when the public program is much more efficient and equitable than the informal 
alternatives. 
The private commercial sector has a potentially valuable role to play in providing 
insurance to low-income households, particularly for life insurance. At present, though,   34 
most programs remain small, and the challenge is to create a viable network of 
companies. 
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